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is paper focuses onomas S. Kuhn’s work on taxonomic concepts and how it
relates to empirical work from the cognitive sciences on categorization and concep-
tual development. I shall rst review the basic features of Kuhn’s family resemblance
account and compare to work from the cognitive sciences. I shall then show how
Kuhn’s account can be extended to cover the development of new taxonomies in
science, and I shall illustrate by a detailed case study that Kuhn himself mentioned
only briey in his own work, namely the discovery of X-rays and radioactivity.
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1. Introduction
How concepts divide entities into categories and how concepts develop over
time is an ongoing concern of cognitive psychologists, cognitive anthropol-
ogists as well as philosophers. A central question for all of them is to what
extent concepts and categories reect structures of the world and to what
extent they are constructed by the human categorizers. Investigating this
question, cognitive anthropologists have conducted cross-cultural studies
to examine the roles of environment and culture, nature and the human in-
tellect in establishing concepts and categories. Similarly, cognitive psychol-
ogists have conducted experiments to illuminate to what extent concepts
are given by structures in the environment and to what extent they are cre-
ated through processes on behalf of the human categorizer. Among philoso-
phers the question has been the focus of the longstanding “realism debate”,
where philosophers have discussed whether our concepts are approximately
correct characterizations of some world of theory-independent entities, or
whether what we refer to as “the world” is a product of a mutual accommo-
dation between experience and language.
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134 Conceptual Development and Dynamic Realism
In this paper, I shall focus on the work ofomas Kuhn and how he
attempted to integrate insights from cognitive science and philosophy in
developing an account of concepts that could substantiate his intermediate
position in the philosophical realism debate. An important theme in Kuhn’s
work aere Structure of Scientic Revolutionswere to rene and substanti-
ate the claims advanced in Structure on concepts and conceptual structures.
Kuhn worked on this for several decades during which he published sev-
eral journal articles,1 but the book manuscript he was working on towards
the end of his life remained unnished and has so far not been published.2
is article will focus on his work on taxonomic conceptual structures as “a
more general sort of categorizing module” (Kuhn 1990, 5) in which “certain
sorts of expectation about the world are embedded” (cf. Kuhn 1990, 8), and
on the deeply historically rooted position on realism that can be inferred
from this work. As a piece of work in philosophy of science in practice, this
paper shall especially focus on how Kuhn’s account can explain researchers
practices when discovering new phenomena and developing new scientic
concepts to describe them, and on how Kuhn’s account compares to work
from cognitive science on humans’ use of concepts in general.
2. A Similarity-Based Account of Concepts
On Kuhn’s view, taxonomic concepts build on relations of similarity and
dissimilarity between perceived objects. Kuhn here ascribed a special im-
portance the features which dierentiate between instances of contrasting
concepts, that is, concepts whose instances are more similar to one another
than to instances of other concepts and which can therefore be mistaken
for each other (see e.g. Kuhn 1979, 413. Because the instances of contrasting
concepts aremore similar to one another than to instances of other concepts,
such a set of concepts will in itself also form a family resemblance class at the
superordinate level. In this way, family resemblance concepts form hierar-
chical structures in which a general concept decomposes into more specic
concepts that may again decompose into yet more specic concepts, and so
forth—in other words, taxonomies.
In one of his unpublished talks, Kuhn illustrated this with a “fragment
of a lexicon for physical things” where he showed by use of his favourite ex-
ample on waterfowls how a superordinate concept decomposes into a group
of contrasting concepts, and how this decomposition is determined by sets
of features (gure 1).
1 For an overview, see (Andersen forthcoming).
2 Only a few people have had access to the manuscript. However, at the MIT Archive, notes
can be found from a course he gave on the developing manuscript in the last semester
before he retired.
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Fig. 1. From T. S. Kuhn: An Historian’seory of Meaning, Talk to Cognitive
Science Colloquium, UCLA 4/25/90.
us, Kuhn described that in his gure, “to each node in a taxonomic
tree is attached aname . . . and a set of features useful fordistinguishing among
creatures at the next level down”.us, the features attached to a name in the
gure “function as dierentiae for the next level down” (Kuhn 1990, 5, em-
phasis in the original).3
3 In this simple example about waterfowl dierentiae are all purely visual features, such as
the neck/head-length ratio, body width/length ratio and colour listed in the gure. Kuhn
never went beyond simple examples like that of waterfowl, but he repeatedly claimed that
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According to Kuhn’s account, the conceptual and perceptual subdivi-
sion of the world into objects and phenomena is thus constituted by simi-
larity and dissimilarity relations. Kuhn claimed that these relations of sim-
ilarity and dissimilarity are “immediate” (Kuhn 1970, 197, fn. 14) or “prim-
itive” (Kuhn 1970, 190) in the sense that they are not based on a similarity-
conferring third and that this immediacy is possible because there is an
“empty perceptual space between the families to be discriminated” (Kuhn
1970, 197, fn. 14). us, instead of some “world’s-real-joints” as postulated
by standard realist accounts, Kuhn here draws on the joints of the phenom-
enal world to substantiate the claim of the immediacy of the similarity and
dissimilarity relations. Kuhnwas very explicit that this seemed to be a neces-
sary premise for adopting a similarity approach to concepts and categoriza-
tion, arguing that if there were no such empty perceptual spaces, denitions
would be necessary to establish the boundaries of categories and a family
resemblance account therefore impossible:
Only if the families we named overlapped and merged gradually into
one another—only, that is, if there were no natural families—would
our success in identifying and naming provide evidence for a set of
common characteristics corresponding to each of the class names we
employ (Kuhn 1970, 45).
At the same time Kuhn wanted to avoid the traditional realist position
that there is one set of the world’s real joints such that all relations of similar-
ity and dissimilarity can be read o the world itself. us, although Kuhn’s
position implies empty perceptual space between the families to be discrim-
inated, there may be empty perceptual space along many dierent dimen-
sions that do not all discriminate between the same families.
As described in detail by Hoyningen-Huene (1993), in order to under-
stand Kuhn’s position it is important to distinguish to notions of the world:
the phenomenal world which is a “perceived world” (Kuhn 1970, 128), and
the world-in-itself which is a “hypothetical xed nature” (Kuhn 1970, 118, cf.
Hoyningen-Huene 1993, ch. 2.1). On this view, “the referential relationship
is between words and objects which are co-constituted by subject-sided and
object-sided moments” (Hoyningen-Huene et al. 1996, 139f). Hence, this
phenomenal world is perceptually and conceptually subdivided in a certain
way, but contrary to a traditional realist view, this subdivision is not read o
from the world in itself, instead, it is a structure which is imposed on the
world by means of the concepts applied to it. Further, although this con-
ceptual and perceptual subdivision is constituted by a grouping in similarity
basically the same account would hold for scientic concepts as well (see e.g. Kuhn 1974,
313).
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classes of the perceived objects referred to by the concepts, the underlying
similarity relations are not theoretical same-kind-as relations determined by
internal structural traits of the “world’s-real-joints”, discoverable by scientic
investigations. Instead, the similarity relations are constitutive of the struc-
ture of the phenomenal world, that is, of which objects exist in this world.
us, dierent sets of similarity relations may constitute dierent ontolo-
gies.4
Kuhn’s family resemblance account of concepts is very similar to ac-
counts developed in cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology.5 In-
spired by Wittgenstein, the notion of family resemblance was advanced
within psychological research on concepts in the early 1970s, most notably
by Eleanor Rosch (1973a,b), Rosch and Mervis (1975), Rosch et al. (1976).
During the 1970s Rosch and her collaborators carried out a wide range of
experiments, all showing that instances of a concept vary in how good exam-
ples of the concept they are.is result has since been used by several cogni-
tive scientists as an argument for adopting an account of concepts based on
similarity and dissimilarity between instances instead of an account based
on denitions in the form of necessary and sucient conditions. is re-
search on graded structures was based on the assumption that “the world
does contain ‘intrinsically separate things”’ (Rosch et al. 1976, 383), or, as
Rosch and her collaborators elaborated,
e world is structured because real-world attributes do not occur
independently of each other. Creatures with feathers are more likely
to have wings than creatures with fur, and objects with the visual ap-
pearance of chairs are more likely to have functional sit-on-ableness
than objects with the appearance of cats.at is, combinations of at-
tributes of real objects do not occur uniformly. Some pairs, triples,
or ntuples are quite probably, appearing in combination sometimes
with one, sometimes another attributes; others are rare; others logi-
cally cannot or empirically do not occur (Rosch et al. 1976, 383).
However, their view was not as purely realist as it might seem. Although
they explicitly talked about the “concrete world” (Rosch et al. 1976, 382)
containing “intrinsically separate things” (Rosch et al. 1976, 383) or stated
that “the material objects of the world possess high correlational structure”
(Rosch et al. 1976, 428), they later in the same paper conceded that “our
claim that there is structure ‘out there’ in the world is not a metaphysical
claim about the existence of a world without a knower, but an empirical
claim which includes the knower” (Rosch et al. 1976, 429). Or as Rosch later
phrased this non-realist claim: “we are talking about the perceivedworld and
4 See also (Andersen 2001) for a detailed exposition of this position.
5 See also (Andersen 2004) for further details.
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not a metaphysical world without a knower” (Rosch 1978, 29, italics added).
What they had inmind with this qualication was that the kind of attributes
that could be perceived could well depend on several things. First, only
“given a knower who can perceive the complex attributes of feathers, fur,
and wings, it is an empirical fact ‘out there’ that wings co-occur with feathers
more than with fur” (Rosch et al. 1976, 429). us, the perceived attributes
could depend on the perceiving subject and could, for example, be dierent
for dierent species (cf. Rosch 1978, 429). In addition, among these species-
specic potentially perceivable attributes, it also depends on the functional
needs of the knower which attributes actually are perceived. e category
system therefore does not reect the correla-tional structure of the environ-
ment in itself, but “the correlational structure of the environment, modied
by selective ignorance and exaggeration of the attributes and structure of
that environment” (Rosch et al. 1976, 435). On this view, objects result from
an interaction between the potential structure provided by the world and
the human categorizer, but this interaction is not unrestricted. Instead, the
environment places constraints on categorizations. As Rosch and collabo-
rators phrased it, “human knowledge cannot provide correlational structure
where there is none. Humans can only ignore or exaggerate correlational
structures” (Rosch et al. 1976, 430).
3. Elaborating Kuhn’s Account
As Kuhn developed his account of scientic concepts, he kept emphasiz-
ing the importance of contrast sets and the features useful for dierentiating
between them. A key point in his account is that concepts are projectible
in the sense that they imply hypotheses about how their instances behave,
and this projectibility may develop gradually as new features are discovered.
But although in this way he kept emphasizing that the use of a concept may
be governed by several dierent criteria and that their coexistence repre-
sent knowledge about “the situations that nature does and does not present”
(Kuhn 1970, 191), he did not himself pursue the implications of these corre-
lations between criteria in much detail.
But Kuhn’s basic idea of dierentiating features has been adopted and
elaborated upon by others, including the historian of science Jed Buchwald
(1992) and the philosopher of science Xiang Chen (1997).ey have shown
how instruments and experiments play an important role in distinguishing
kinds, including in the development of new scientic kinds. Both Buchwald
and Chen see instruments and experiments as sorting devices that distin-
guish instances of contrasting concepts by determining specic properties
which dier for instances of contrasting concepts. Initially, a new concept
may be introduced just on the basis of a single dierentiating feature that
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distinguishes its instances from instances of a known concept. As Buchwald
has described this situation, “a novel taxonomy may emerge as someone at-
tempts to grapple with a particular device” (Buchwald 1992, 44). In the case
described later, we shall see an example of exactly this kind of process. But it
usually takes more than just dierent behaviours of a single device to posit
new categories. Whereas the rst device is used to establish a contrast be-
tween two phenomena, it will then be attempted to nd additional ways to
establish the same contrast, for example by using dierent devices or exper-
iments. us, Buchwald also added the qualifying notion of the “strength”
or “robustness” of a taxonomy which to some extend reects its device inde-
pendence, “the ease with which it can be separated from the device” (Buch-
wald 1992, 44). Hence, although concepts may be introduced on the basis of
just a single dierentiating feature, it is at the same time crucial that “a robust
taxonomy is also compatible with many other devices that do what the tax-
onomy considers to be the same thing that the rst one does but in entirely
dierent ways” (Buchwald 1992, 44). In the process, additional dierentiat-
ing features may be introduced, and as more of such details are added, the
concept will be perceived as more and more “robust”. In other words, a con-
cept becomes increasingly “robust” or entrenched asmore andmore features
or combinations of features determined by the use of dierent instruments
of experiments select the same category. Similar considerations on when to
posit a new entity have been advanced by, among others, Arabatzis (2008,
forthcoming). He argues that when scientists consider whether or not to
posit the existence of an hidden entity, “the over-determination of a hidden
entity’s properties in dierent experimental systems is oen an important
reason in favor of its existence” (Arabatzis 2008, 14). However, robustness
is not only related to device independence and the correlation of character-
istics. While initial, explorative research is a new area is oen focused on
empirical examinations of possible correlations of characteristics, the next
step is oen to develop reasons for these correlations, that is, theories that
explain why these particular characteristics are correlated.
is urge to derive theories that explain the correlation of characteris-
tics is not specic for scientic concepts, but has been the topic of general
discussion in cognitive science. Cognitive scientists such as Murphy and
Medin have argued that, generally, people tend to deduce reasons for at-
tribute correlations; a view that has become known as the theory-theory of
concepts.6us, they believed, that “feature correlations are partly supplied
by people’s theories and that the causal mechanism contained in theories
are the means by which correlational structure is represented” (Murphy and
6 Note that theory-theorists cover a variety of dierent views on what count as theories; see
(Laurence and Margolis 1999) for a brief overview.
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Medin 1999, 431); a belief they soon sought to vindicate empirically (e.g.
Medin et al. 1987). As indicated by Laurence and Margolis (1999, 45), the
theory-theory’s focus on underlying causal explanations of the correlation
of surface attributes may encourage essentialist views. However, there is
no overall agreement among theory-theorists whether this essentialism has
to be interpreted metaphysically or psychologically. On the one end of the
spectrum, scholars like Medin and Ortony restricted their essentialist view
to psychological essentialism, that is, the idea that surface features are con-
strained or generated by deeper parts of the concept in question (cf. Medin
andOrtony 1989, 180). Similar views are expressed by e.g. (Malt 1990).us,
they emphasized that psychological essentialism “would not be the view
that things have essences, but rather the view that people’s representations
of things might reect such a belief (erroneously as it may be)” (Medin and
Ortony 1989, 183). On their view, the features that appear essential are not so
because of the structure of the world, but because they are the features that
are most central to our understanding of the world (cf. Murphy and Medin
1999, 454). By the same token, later versions of the theory-theory such as the
causal status interpretation of attribute centrality emphasizes that the causal
status hypotheses diers from metaphysical essentialism in not necessarily
assuming that causal attributes are dening and in not dichotomizing at-
tributes into essential and surface attributes, and that “the causal status eect
arises as a result of specic knowledge people have about causal relations,
whereas some essentialists argue that essential properties are independent
of our knowledge of them” (Ahn 1998, 163).
4. Illustration: Revisiting the Discovery of X-rays and Radioac-
tivity
On the account developed above, a central idea in conceptual development
is the introduction of new, rudimentary concepts that initially capture a
general idea but still is in need of further articulation; what Carey (2009)
refers to as “placeholder concepts” or “placeholder structures”.is kind of
conceptual development is what takes place in what Steinle has called ex-
ploratory experimentation, that is, experimentation that is “driven by the
elementary desire to obtain empirical regularities and to nd out proper
concepts and classications by means of which those regularities can be for-
mulated” (Steinle 1997).
To illustrate, let us consider a relatively simple case study that was treated
as an example only briey by Kuhn in Structure, namely the discovery of X-
rays.7 In Structure, Kuhn merely described how Röntgen one day noticed
7 Cf. (Kuhn 1970, 57f).
Hanne Andersen 141
that a barium platinocyanide screen at some distance from a cathode ray
tube glowed when the discharge was in process, and that this eect had to be
due to some new agent. In his brief description, Kuhn considered the ques-
tion at what point in Röntgen’s investigation one could say that X-rays had
been discovered. He discarded the view that the initial observation of the
glowing screen would suce, and he also discarded the view that it was by
the end of the hectic weeks of research during which Röntgen had explored
the properties of the new radiation that he had already discovered. Instead,
Kuhn thought that X-rays emerged at some point during these weeks. While
Kuhn primarily drew on this example to illustrate that discovering a new
phenomenon is a complex event that involves recognizing both that some-
thing is and what it is (cf. (Kuhn 1970, 55), in the following section I shall
revisit this case and provide an account of how new experiments gradually
led to the introduction of a whole new taxonomy.
In the 1890es, physicists hadmade experiments with discharges between
electrodes in evacuated glass tubes for decades, investigating the light phe-
nomena that arose. In 1895 the German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Rönt-
gen (1845–1923) wanted to investigate cathode rays emitted from the cath-
ode when the pressure in the glass tube was very low. During an experiment
with a cardboard-shrouded tube he discovered that an object across his lab-
oratory began to glow. e object was a coated screen used to detect uo-
rescence caused by the cathode rays, but it was placed so far away from the
tube and behind various items that Röntgen did not think the uorescence
could be caused by cathode rays. Instead he hypothesized that the uores-
cence could be caused by a new kind of rays. us, it is at rst the simple
features of “far away” and “penetrating various things on their way”, and the
clear dierence from cathode rays with respect to these features that made
Röntgen posit a new kind.
But Röntgen immediately began investigating the new rays systemati-
cally, examining this special feature of penetrating power. It turned out that
they penetrated most materials, but to dierent degrees (Röntgen 1896a, 3).
Paper was very transparent; even a book of about one thousand pages would
not stop the rays. Wood was also quite transparent, but aluminum less so.
in plates of lead would almost stop the rays completely. But bone would
also produce shadow pictures. us, if a hand was held between the tube
and a uorescent screen, one would see the dark shadows of the bone. e
rays were also found to blacken a photographic plate, and in his rst publi-
cation on the rays, a communication to the Sitzungsberichte der Würzburger
Physik-medic. Gesellscha from December 28, 1895, Röntgen described var-
ious photographs, among them one of the bones in a hand.8
8 Whereas the photographs were only described in Röntgen’s original publication in Ger-
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Röntgen’s discovery was totally unexpected, and scientists around the
world started explore the nature of these new and unforeseen rays. In Febru-
ary 1896, only two months aer Röntgen’s rst publication of his result, re-
search activity was so intense that the journal Nature declared that “so nu-
merous are the communications being made to scientic societies that is
dicult to keep pace with them, and the limits of our space would be ex-
ceeded if we attempted to described the whole of the contributions to the
subject, even at this early stage” (“e Röntgen Rays”, 377).9
e French Academy of Science was one of the places at which Rönt-
gen’s discovery was immediately discussed. During the discussion it was
suggested that, since the tubes emitting X-rays were uorescent, other u-
orescent bodies might also emit the new kind of rays (Poincaré 1896). Sev-
eral scientists immediately began investigating various uorescent bodies,
among them Henri Becquerel (1852–1908).10
In his rst experiment, Becquerel placed sheets of uranium salt on a pho-
tographic plate that was wrapped in heavy black paper. is was placed in
the sun for several hours so that the uranium salt became uorescent. Aer-
wards the photographic platewas developed, and therewas a black silhouette
of the sheets at the photographic plate (Becquerel 1896b). Becquerel could
therefore conclude that the uorescent uranium salt did indeed emit radi-
ation. us, the experimental investigation of the new taxonomic concept
initially focused on possible similarities in the form of empirical correla-
man (Röntgen 1896a), two of them were included in the translation of the report that was
published in Nature the following month (Röntgen 1896b) and one in the reprint of the
translation published in Science (Röntgen 1896c).
9 One of the important questions with respect to novelties, namely how to communicate
the results when everyone is a novice, has evidently not been a problem in this case. As a
precondition for successful communication of novelties Gooding (1986, 224, 226) suggest
that “[a]t the outset, a construal of novel information may be communicated primarily by
example, or as a set of instructions about how to proceed with an experiment” and that
further explorative success “involves inventing new experiments and constructing new
instruments” that “modify, utilize or apply an eect to produce new information about it,
or new phenomena”.e condition for communicative success has easily been fullled by
the photographs included in the early communications.
10 Charles Henry and Gaston Henri Niewenglowski also conducted experiments to inves-
tigate uorescent bodies. Both reported to have conrmed the hypothesis (Henry 1896,
Niewenglowski 1896) by experiments in which they used zinc sulde irradiated with X-
rays and calcium sulde exposed to sunlight and observed blackenings of wrapped photo-
graphic plates corresponding to the uorescent materials. However, others had diculties
conrming these experiments, and Curie reported in her monograph Recherches sur les
substances radiactives that these experiments “have not been reproduced, in spite of nu-
merous attempts to this end. It cannot therefore be considered as proved that zinc sulde
and calcium sulde are capable of emitting, under the action of light, invisible rays which
traverse black paper and act on photographic plates” (Curie 1961, 5).
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tions: was the phenomena correlated to uorescence, independently of its
source.
Becquerel soon found out that radiation was emitted even when the ura-
nium salt was not uorescent. In the days following his initial experiment
the sun appeared only intermittently, and he placed his wrapped photo-
graphic plates as well as the sheets of uranium salt in a drawer. Aer a few
days he developed the photographic plates, expecting to nd only very weak
images. But the images turned out to be quite intense (Becquerel 1896c). In
conclusion of his report, Becquerel noted:
A hypothesis that presents itself very naturally to the mind would be
to suppose that these radiations, the eect of which have a great anal-
ogy to those produced by the radiations studies by [Philip] Lenard
and Röntgen, would be invisible radiations created by phosphores-
cence whose time of persistence would be innitely greater than that
of the luminous radiations emitted by these bodies. However, the ex-
periments presented, while not being contrary to this hypothesis, do
not authorize one to formulate it. (Becquerel 1896c, 503; translation
from Kipnis 2000, 73).
us, as an initial step Becquerel noted the dierence between the vis-
ible phosphorescence of the uranium salt and the rays that produced the
image on the photographic plate.e next step was to investigate the inten-
sity of this invisible radiation over time, where he found that the intensity
showed no noticeable decrease aer his uranium salt has been kept in dark-
ness for 15 days (Becquerel 1896d) or even two months Becquerel (1896a).
Likewise, Becquerel examined uranium salts known to be non-uorescent
when dissolved and found that also in this case were the new kind of rays
emitted (Becquerel 1896d). Aer several weeks of experimenting with var-
ious salts of uranium and various other uorescent minerals he concluded
that the emission of the rays was due to the presence of the element uranium
(Becquerel 1896a).11
Hence, originally hypothesised by analogy to X-rays, a new concept—
by Becquerel termed Uranium rays—was being formed. Uranium rays were
not triggered by or dependent upon a special state of the emitting source,
they were simply intrinsic to the material that emitted them.e new con-
cept was about to form a new branch as it now diered from the originating
concept with respect to exactly that feature that had initially created the new
area of inquiry. Further characteristics were added to this new branch as
experiments proceeded.us, in one of Becquerel’s rst communications of
11 For detailed discussions of Becquerel’s experiments, see (Badash 1966), (Badash 2005),
(Kipnis 2000).
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the new rays he reported to have observed that the rays would discharge an
electroscope (Becquerel 1896e).
Becquerel had suggested that the new kind of rays were only emitted by
uranium compounds. However, in 1898 Marie Curie reported from studies
of the conductivity of air when various substances were placed between two
plates of a condenser that all uranium compounds were active emitters of
the rays, and in general the more active the more uranium they contained,
and that thorium compounds were very active too (Curie 1898). us, the
concept was extended to include rays emitted by more substances that just
uranium. Examining the increase of radioactivity with the increase of ura-
nium present, Marie Curie and her husband Pierre Curie (1859–1906) also
discovered that the mineral pitchblende was muchmore radioactive than its
uranium content would indicate Curie and Curie (1898).ey hypothesized
that the mineral contained another element that would be more radioactive
than uranium, and named it polonium. A few months later they found that
pitchblende contained yet another highly radioactive element which they
named radium (Curie et al. 1898). Later a third radioactive substance, ac-
tinium, was identied (Debierne 1899, Debierne 1900, Giesel 1902, Giesel
1903; on the priority of this discovery, see Kirby 1971). e concept of ra-
dioactivity and the internal correlations between emitting elements and the
intensity of the radiation had now become so strong that it could be used to
hypothesize new elements.
e early investigations of radioactivitywere of a very explorative nature.
It was a completely new phenomenon with no theory to guide expectations,
so the approach was experimental, focusing on the collection and classica-
tion of data. rough experiments physicists and chemists tried to unravel
lots of questions: What was the nature of the new rays? Were they emitted
by all elements, or only by some? Was the activity aected by chemical pro-
cesses, or by physical changes such as changes in temperature? How did it
all t into the periodic system of the elements?
Becquerel had noted in his rst experiments that while the rays pene-
trated paper, sheets of aluminum or copper would decrease their intensity.
On the basis of a series of similar absorption experiments, the NewZealand-
British physicist Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937) showed that the rays emit-
ted from uranium were complex and contained at least two distinct types
of radiation: one which was very readily absorbed and which he termed
α-radiation, and another of a more penetrative character which he termed
β-radiation (Rutherford 1899). In 1900, the French physicist Paul Villard
(1860–1934) found a third kind of radiation that was even more penetrating
than β-radiation and which was termed γ-radiation (Villard 1900a,b). But
the classication of radiation included more than just penetrating power,
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and deection in magnetic elds as well as the presence of radioactive gas
were soon included among the examined characteristics.12
Further, with the development of nuclear physics it became clear that the
nucleus was not an elementary particle, and that α- and β-radiation was the
result of the spontaneous disintegration of the nucleus, whereas β-radiation
was the result of a transition of the nucleus from an excited state to a state of
lower energy.13 Models of the α- and β-particles explained the correlations of
features—both were particles with specic weights and specic charges, and
this explained both their deection in magnetic elds and their penetrating
power in various materials. Hence, these models explained the correlations
of features for each concept in the contrast set.
is case showed how experiments can act as sorting devices, both in
creating new concepts and in establishing additional dierentiating features
of existing concepts. In this way, the case illustrates how a placeholder con-
cept that is rst introduced on the basis of only a single dierentiating feature
develops into a full-blown taxonomy as more and more empirical regulari-
ties are articulated.
5. Dynamic Ralism
As described above, on Kuhn’s position the conceptual and perceptual sub-
division of theworld into objects and phenomena is constituted by similarity
and dissimilarity relations that are immediate in the sense that they are not
based on a similarity-conferring third and that there is an “empty percep-
tual space between the families to be discriminated.” At rst sight, this may
seem circular: delineated categories secure the immediacy of the relations of
similarity and dissimilarity, but at the same time the relations of similarity
and dissimilarity are constitutive of the categories. However, this apparent
circularity vanishes once we adopt a historical, or dynamic, view. On such
a view, the phenomenal world is never structured from scratch by its inhab-
itants. Instead, the inhabitants of any phenomenal world have always been
born into some version of it. As Kuhn explained, they originally found this
world “already in place, its rudiments at their birth and its increasingly full
actuality during their educational socialization, a socialization in which ex-
amples of theway theworld is play an essential part. . . .Creatures born into it
must take it as they nd it.ey can, of course, interact with it, altering both
it and themselves in the process, and the populated world thus altered is the
one that will be found in place by the generation which follows” (Kuhn 1991,
12 See (Trenn 1976) for an overview showing how the development of the classication
scheme for radioactive rays accommodated fundamental conceptual changes concerning
the nature of the several types of rays.
13 On the development of the transmutation theory, see i.e. (Malley 1979) and (Romer 1958).
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10). Hence, concepts and categories are inherited by any generation from
their predecessors and are therefore in place, ready to secure the immediacy
of the relations of similarity and dissimilarity for the new generation. But
once the new generation has gained access to this particular phenomenal
world they may start reshaping it by introducing new relations of similar-
ity and dissimilarity and abandoning old ones, and thus provide a dierent
set of concepts and categories to their successors than the set they inherited
themselves.
An important aspect of this dynamic realism is that in this dynamically
developing world, new concepts referring to new kinds are also introduced
gradually.is is a point that Kuhn only hinted upon by discussing the dif-
culties of determining when a phenomenon is actually discovered when
the discovery process extends from the rst discovery of something new
and strange to the later exploration of its properties (cf. Kuhn 1970, 57f).
As argued above, a concept becomes more and more entrenched as more
and more features or combinations of features select the same category. But
as also argued above, there is more to entrenchment than just device inde-
pendence and correlation of dierent feature. If we look at the case study,
admittedly the initial explorative research was focused on empirical exam-
ination of various possible correlations of features: which features seem to
be correlated, which new concepts based on these feature correlations arise,
and so on. But what would soon follow was the development of reasons
for these correlations, theories that would explain why specic features were
correlated.14
But although the dynamic realism developed here includes a gradual de-
velopment of underlying explanations of those surface features that initially
have served as the primary dierentiae in introducing the new kind concept,
it still diers in important ways from the causal theory of reference. On the
causal theory of reference, reference is established in an original naming cer-
emony in which the object or kind to which the concept in question shall re-
fer is singled out by ostension or by a description, and in subsequent use the
concept continues to refer to the entity to which it was attached on the occa-
sion of its introduction. e same-kind-as relation therefore refers back to
the original naming ceremony. Further, the same-kind-as relation is taken
to be a theoretical relation determined by the internal structural traits of the
objects to which the term refers, and the details of the relation can be discov-
14 It is important to note that although the development of explanations will be an essential
part of stabilizing new concepts, the mere correlation of features can be an important re-
search topic in itself, even though these regularities may (initially) be unexplained—an as-
pect of experimentation that, as Steinle has noted “has not found much attention” (Steinle
2002, 420).
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ered by scientic research (Putnam 1975, Boyd 1993). In this way, the causal
theory of reference is thus based on the realist assumption that there exists
some xed realm of “theory-independent entities”, (Putnam 1975, 236) and
that the aim of science is to improve the accordance between our concepts
and these entities, to “cut the world at its joints” (Boyd 1993, similarly Put-
nam 1975). In contrast, on the dynamic realist account developed here, the
relations of similarity and dissimilarity are not purely determined by some
internal structural traits of the “world’s real joints” to be discovered by sci-
entic investigations. Instead, as argued in section 2 above, the relations
of similarity and dissimilarity are constitutive of which objects exist in the
world that we perceive so that dierent sets of similarity and dissimilarity
relations may constitute dierent ontologies.
is dynamic viewmay at rst sight seem to evoke the question how the
process gets o the ground, how does the “rst” taxonomy get established.
But once we recognize that conceptual structures are dynamic entities that
have evolved through history, we can imagine that, theoretically, an initial
conceptual structure may be established by conjecture. By investigating the
categorized objects, other features additional to those used when conjec-
turing the categorization may prove relevant for category membership. In
addition, as new objects are investigated and as more features are involved
in judging category membership, anomalies may be encountered necessitat-
ing changes of conceptual structure. In this way the conceptual structure
continuously develops in order to provide consistent categorizations of all
known objects within the object domain. However, although establishing
conceptual structures in an initial act is therefore possible, dismissing the
developmental perspective and the shi of emphasis from synchronic con-
stitution to diachronic transmission is too hasty a conclusion. By keeping
the developmental perspective, the continuous development of conceptual
structures is a phylogenetic process in which conceptual structures keep de-
veloping to continuously provide consistent classications of an ever grow-
ing number of known objects. On this view, the interesting issue is not how
the phenomenal world was initially established, but only how the phenome-
nal world continuously develops.
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